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COMMENTS
the testator, while donees of non-probate property are less closely
related, and that the effect of depleting the residue is to allow stran-
gers to take free of taxation at the cost of forcing the widow and
children to pay the tax upon property which is of no benefit to them"2
The rule adopted by the principal case that, in the absence of direc-
tion by the decedent, the federal estate tax upon non-probate property
should be borne proportionately by the donees of that property, and
should not be levied upon the residuary legacy, is much to be pre-
ferred over a rule depleting the benefits of the residuary legatees in
order to allow a non-probate donee to escape the heavy burden of
federal estate taxation. The United States Supreme Court, by point-
ing out that the federal statute is silent as to where the tax burden
shall fall,15 has destroyed any potency which the argument for forcing
the tax load upon the residue may ever have had. The failure of those
states burdening the residue to re-examine their rule in the light of
judicial development and the advent of heavier taxes upon the estate
is without justification.- Clearly, the Missouri Supreme Court reached
a proper decision in apportioning the federal estate tax equitably
among those benefiting from the non-probate estate.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE--SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR TO HUSBAND BY
SALOONKEEPER AFTER PROHIBITORY NOTICE BY WIE
Cole v. Rush, 271 P.2d 47 (Cai.1954)
Deceased's widow and minor children brought an action against
defendant saloonkeeper to recover for the loss of decedent's comfort
and support occasioned by his wrongful death. The complaint alleged
defendant knew deceased was pugnacious when intoxicated and had
been requested by the widow not to sell liquor to the deceased in suffi-
cient quantity to allow him to become intoxicated, but that defendant
refused to comply with this request. The complaint further alleged
that deceased became inebriated after drinking liquor sold to him by
the defendant and that deceased then engaged in a fight with another
person, during which the deceased suffered injuries resulting in his
immediate death. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the corn-
plaint. The Supreme Court of California, reversing that judgment,
held that the surviving spouse and children of a decedent have a cause
of action against a saloonkeeper who, with notice, sells alcoholic bev-
erages to a husband causing him to become intoxicated, from which
24. See 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIrT TAXATION § 13.54 (1942).
25. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
26. As to the argument for levying the estate tax upon probate assets against
the residuary estate, while continuing to tax non-probate beneficiaries propor-
tionately, see Comment, 31 B.U.L. REv. 233 (1951).
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condition the wife and children suffer a loss of his comfort and sup-
port.
In many states, civil damage statutes allow recovery of damages
from the supplier of intoxicating liquor by those who sustain injury
to their person, property, or means of support by reason of the intoxi-
cation of a person.2 The majority of such states permit a widow to re-
cover damages for her loss of support from a saloonkeeper selling
liquor to her husband, if he dies as a result of intoxication.3 In these
states, however, the statutory right of recovery is exclusive,4 and a
wife, whose case fails to fall within the statutory requirements, which
may include giving prohibitory notice to the saloonkeeper, 5 will be de-
nied recovery under common law principles on the ground that the
state provides no remedy to the wife when her husband dies as a con-
sequence of his becoming intoxicated. The reasons advanced in those
states for denying relief when the statutory terms are not met are
that: (1) there is no negligence in furnishing liquor to an able-bodied
man; 6 or (2) the consumption of the liquor by the deceased, rather
than the sale to him, was the proximate cause of any subsequent dam-
age, and the deceased husband, by becoming intoxicated, was himself
contributorily negligent, thus barring recovery for his wrongful death
by the wife.1
In those states not having civil damage statutes, few cases involving
a saloonkeeper's liability to the wife of a person injured while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor have appeared in the appellate re-
ports. In two cases having facts similar to the principal case, Pratt V.
Daly,s and Swanson v. Ball,9 the saloonkeeper was held liable to a wife
for the loss of her husband's consortium when the saloonkeeper con-
tinued to sell liquor to the husband after the wife requested him not
1. Cole v. Rush, 271 P.2d 47 (Cal. 1954).
2. BLACK, INTOXICATING LiQuoRs § 277 (1892). See 48 C.J.S., INTOXICATING
LIQUORS § 431, p. 716 (1947).
3. Leading cases establishing this rule are; Emory v. Addis, 71 Il1. 273(1874); Rafferty v. Buckman, 46 Iowa 195 (1877); Gardner v. Day, 95 Me. 558,
50 Atl. 892 (1901); Brockway v. Patterson, 72 Mich. 122, 40 N.W. 192 (1888);
Fest v. Olson, 138 Minn. 31, 163 N.W. 798 (1917); Roose v. Perkins, 9 Neb. 304,
2 N.W. 715 (1879); Mead v. Stratton, 87 N.Y. 493 (1882); Healey v. Cady, 104
Vt. 463, 161 At]. 151 (1932). But cf. Crist v. Klitz, 232 Wis. 567, 288 N.W. 175(1939). Contra: Barrett v. Dolan, 13D Mass. 366 (1881); Davis v. Justice, 31
Ohio St. 359 (1877); Pegram v. Stortz, 31 W. Va. 220, 6 S.E. 485 (1888).
4. Cruse-v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1389); Dowling v. Stephan, 133
N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1954) ; Healey v. Cady, 104 Vt. 463, 161 At]. 151 (1932).
5. See, e.g., Demge v. Feierstein, 222 Wis. 199, 268 N.W. 210 (1936) (wife
orally requested saloonkeeper to desist instead of furnishing written notice an
provided by statute).
6. Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889).
7. Dernge v. Feierstein, 222 Wis. 199, 268 N.W. 210 (1936). See Note, 130
A.L.R. 352, 358-359 (1941).
8. 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940).
9. 67 S.D. 161, 290 N.W. 482 (1940).
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to do so. Both of these cases allowed recovery by analogy to cases' in-
volving the sale of habit-forming drugs to a husband after the wife
had previously given prohibitory notice to the druggist. The wife, in
a loss of consortium action, however, is allowed to recover only the
damages she sustains because of the defendant's wrongful conduct
prior to the husband's death and can not recover in such action dam-
ages for the husband's wrongful death.'- The rationale of the two
cases appears to be that the wife, by giving notice to the saloonkeeper
not to sell liquor to the husband, imposes upon the bartender a duty
owing to the wife to look after the welfare of his inebriate patron.'2 If
the saloonkeeper, having been warned by the wife, has actual knowl-
edge of the patron's alcoholic tendency or lack of volition to refuse
drink, he negligently breaches the duty to the wife of the patron by
disregarding her request and selling liquor to the husband, from which
the latter becomes intoxicated. The cause of action accruing to the
wife in these cases is independently based upon the invasion of those
interests she has in continuing the marital relationship and in receiv-
ing all the benefits which that status confers upon her ;13 it is not de-
rived from any cause of action which the husband, had he survived,
might have instituted. Thus, if the husband had survived and sued the
saloonkeeper in the principal case, he would have been denied recovery
for the injuries to himself.'
The complainants in the principal case sought to recover damages
for their loss of comfort and support occasioned by the wrongful death
of the husband and father. This type of action, unlike a wife's suit
for loss of consortium, is not independently based upon the invasion of
the wife's interest in the marital relationship, but is derived from the
civil wrong inflicted upon the deceased by the defendant. 15 Inasmuch as
California does not have a civil damage act, such an action must neces-
sarily be predicated upon its wrongful death statute. 6 But contribu-
10. Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327. 98 N.E. 102 (1912); Moberg v.
Scott, 38 S.D. 422, 161 N.W. 998 (1917).
11. Burk v. Anderson, 109 N.E.2d 407 (Ind. 1952); Swanson v. Ball, 27 S.D.
161, 290 N.W. 482 (1940). Although the writer of the opinion in the former
case believed that a wife should be accorded a remedy for her loss of consortium,
he agreed with the majority of the court that her recoverable damages would be
limited as they are in a husband's similar cause of action. See 41 CJ.S., HUSBAND
AND WIFE § 401(5), p. 899 (1944); PRossmi, TORTS 940 (1941).
12. The duty owing to the wife by the bartender after., she has given him pro-
hibitory notice is in addition to the duty owing by the tavern owner to protect his
guests from the assaults of intoxicated persons upon his premises. Leading cases
on the saloonkeeper's duty to his business invitees are: Curran v. Olson, 88 Minn.
307, 92 N.W. 1124 (1903); Peck v. Gerber, 154 Ore. 126, 59 P.2d 675 (1936);
Rommel v. Schambacher, 120 Pa. 579, 11 At. 779 (1887).
13. See PxOSsER:, TORTS 945-946 (1941). For a thorough discussion of the
reasons why the courts should accord to the wife a remedy for her loss of con-
sortium, as was done in the leading case of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d
811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), see 1951 WASH. U.L.Q. 261.
14. See, e.g., Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (1943).
15. See PRossER, TORTS 965-966 (1941).
16. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 377 (1953).
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tory negligence by the deceased is a bar to an action under the latter."
It is submitted, therefore, that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action for the wife's and children's loss of support occasioned by the
wrongful death of the head of the household since the complaint re-
vealed upon its face that the deceased was contributorily negligent'
Nor could the wife sue for loss of consortium since her damages would
be limited to the injuries she sustained during the interim between the
defendant's tortious conduct and the husband's death which, since
death was immediate, would be nothing.19 The trial court, accordingly,
properly sustained the demurrer to the complaint and the Supreme
Court's decision, on rehearing,20 should be reversed.
17. See, e.g, Studer v. Southern Pac. Co., 121 Cal. 400 53 Pac. 942 (1898).
18. See, e.g., Demge v. Feierstein, 222 Wis. 199, 268 N.. 210 (1936).
19. See note 11 supra.
20. On June 30, 1954, the court granted a rehearing of the case. Cole v. Rus,
271 P.2d 47 (Cal. 1954).
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